Western Theory in an Eastern Reality

Realism, whilst entailing some aspects yet to be witnessed in the whirlwind of recent Asian international relations, maintains core underpinning principles that remain applicable outside of the West and proves that Western IR theories can be both useful and relevant today. In this essay I will begin by outlining Realism and its different formations, before describing how Mastanduno’s (2014) propositions can be seen today alongside the predictions of Mearsheimer’s (2005) offensive Neorealist approach. I will then opposingly look at the critiques of Western IR’s relevance, particularly those theorist’s arguments against the applicability of Realism. Finally, I will return to my standpoint and countering these critiques, providing multiple reasons for the state of Asian affairs that adhere to-albeit differing-conceptions of Realism and I will further defend the utility of underpinning universal principles found in Western IR.

Realism remains one of the most commonly applied theories of IR originating out of the West, this is in part due to its simple, positivist nature, reliant on past occurrences. Realism takes states to be the highest powers, acting rationally in self-interest given their position in the anarchical playing field of IR (Mastanduno, 2014: 4) (Sandrina Antunes, 2018). Power then, is the key motivation for states, whereby offensive Neorealists such as Mearsheimer (2005: 1) see power as the means as well as an insatiable end, defensive Neorealists such as Waltz view the grasp for power to merely maintain security within such an unstable global system (Sandrina Antunes, 2018: 2). On immediate consideration of Realism’s core foundations, one does not see how it could be tied to a specific geographic location. The seeking of power by states seems a non-radical assumption, despite long-standing peace in the region given the last interstate conflict having occurred in 1979. Power can be sought after through economic positioning, advancing standing within institutions, or developing defence infrastructure for example. It is not a stretch to assume that despite so much variety in political systems across Asia, the incentives are the advancement of the influence and strategic power of their respective state to secure power hold and serve the interests of the people.

In conjunction with these quite non-constraining principles Acharya (2014: 62) puts forward the crucial point that Asia has changed massively in the last hundred years. War, globalism, and foreign occupation has dispersed western norms across the continent and done away with attributes that might have hindered application of Western originating theories. In the final section I will further elaborate in regard to the fading of the Tribute system. It is worth mentioning initially, that China, Japan and South Korea all went through massive political change in the 20th century and all being well within the global system at that point of change (China would then rescind from diplomatic relations with the U.S. from the PRC’s founding in 1949 until 1978) (Panikker, 2000: 79). So, alongside Acharya’s (2014: 62) point that East Asian IR is more and more resembling the West’s we can look to one of the most assured predictions of realism that China’s rise offers a potentially dangerous scenario. This fear is outlined in Mastanduno’s (2014: 7) second proposition alongside Mearsheimer’s (2005) essay. While China is not presently at war, tensions on different fronts are simmering and China is appearing “to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries” like Mearsheimer (2005) foresaw. We see this in regards to border disputes with India from 2017 to the present, the entering of Taiwanese airspace by Chinese jets that continues presently and the construction of artificial islands in 2014 to further claims to the south China sea (Sharma, 2022) (CBS News, 2022) (Aljazeera, 2021). In zooming in on Mearsheimer’s (2005) Western theoretical analysis, it has proven accurate in regards to fears concerning China’s rise and also that it’s security escalation would not be for the reason of a “rampage” as he puts it. We are however yet to see America pushed out of Asia by a China who he claims will not tolerate competing hegemonic regional powers, so we are yet to witness all of this neorealistic approach come to fruition.

Moving to the second part of this essay, there are certainly arguments to be made for the complete non-inclusion of Western theories of IR in Asia, particularly put forward by Kang (2006: 66-85) who argues that Asia is yet to witness vigorous balancing. Kang (2013: 189) also goes on to insist that power is not the paramount motivation for states at all times. Firstly, looking at balancing, Realism would infer that China, being the rising hegemonic power in the region, would see other states coalesce to balance against it to maintain equilibrium so as not to be dominated, militarily or economically. Kang (2006: 58) argues that this is yet to be witnessed. One could look to Japan as an example, an economic powerhouse yet wilfully constraining its military capabilities within 1% of its GDP, instead both Kang (2006: 69-7) and Roy (2005) describe how weaker Asian states have permitted China’s rise to go unhindered to maintain trade relations. China remains the largest trading partner of Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan amongst many others (Sundell, 2022). Furthermore, at the time of Kangs (2006) writing Japan was the 2nd largest economy in the world and it was making no attempt to counter even American power positioning, let alone China. Following from Japan’s unwillingness to balance against China, we also see that the two states continue significant economic cooperation despite security concerns, Mastanduno (2014: 15) outlines this contradiction to what he lays as the 5th proposition of Realists. He refers to this dynamic as “cold politics, hot economics”. Thus, despite Realism’s sly approach to avoid saying economic relations are difficult during “uncertain security environment[s]” as an absolute, we can see that one of biggest economic relationships, that being flows between Japan and China, continue en-masse despite security issues (Mastanduno, 2014: 15). So to, do the massive economic flows between China and the U.S., despite the Director of national intelligence labelling China as the “greatest threat to democracy and freedom” in 2020 (Reuters, 2020). Lastly Kang (2013: 189) provides the example of the Tribute system as opposing evidence against power being the primary motivation of states. Kang describes how the unquestioned norms and traditions tied into the Tribute system dictated modes of interaction between China and other Asian states regardless of power dynamics or military friction, things Realists would pose as the most significant factors. So, we see how there are certainly elements of Asian IR that one could argue remain unaccounted for by Realism as a Western theory.

Finally, I will now incur counter arguments to critiques of Realism and its lack of applicability due to its Western origin. The scope of Realism is large and it takes various forms, and so balancing’s eternal presence doesn’t define all Realism. While balancing forms one of Waltz’ three causal claims as Kang (2013: 186) outlines, offensive Neorealists see the reality of buck-passing or bandwagon-ing as more likely (Mearsheimer, 2001: 63). Thus, one of the most popular approaches to Realism, propagated by Mearsheimer, skirts past Kang’s critique and remains relevant. Furthermore, Mastanduno (2014: 5) describes how Realism can see security orders emerge from not just balance of power workings but also “hegemony of a single” state or a “concert of great powers”. Even in the case of a Realist sticking to balancing, one could look at Johnston’s (2012: 60) point of “soft balancing”. In this sense Japan’s encouragement of socialising China and including it within institutions could be seen as a mode of balancing, reducing possibility of hostility (Goh, 2011: 888). A further rebuke to Kang’s (2013: 189) fore-mentioned criticism is that the Tribute system ceases to exist in the present age, rendering his sole example of power’s lack of predominance as a motivation for states, as redundant in modern IR. A further point is that Realism pivots on what it views as objective realities of human nature, (Williams, 1993: 106) thus not anchored geographically. Whilst Neorealism’s slippery unfalsifiable nature comes to the frustration of scholars such as Kang (2013), it presents the answer to this essay question, yes as a broad theory it remains useful and applicable. Both Acharya (2014: 79) and Yeophantong (2018) agree that Asian/Chinese schools of IR are still only in their infancy, the former stating that Western IR theories only need to “include the Asian experience” to remain relevant, the latter even suggesting there is “nothing Western about IR theorising”.

To conclude then, I began with presenting examples of Realism’s insights playing out in the Asian system. I then looked at countering arguments against Realism and the applying of Western IR in general. I finally addressed these critiques and showing that there is more than one approach to Realism and that its scope can easily include the unique nature of Asian dynamics, providing a solid grounding for making the case that on a selective basis, Western theories of IR certainly remain useful and relevant in analysing Asian IR.

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